INTRODUCTION
The relationship between ownership and performance has been a vexing and, to a large extent, unresolved issue despite the existence of an extensive volume of theoretical and empirical literature on the subject. According to the property rights hypothesis (e.g., Alchian, 1965; de Alessi, 1980) , private enterprises should perform more efficiently and more profitably than public enterprises. The potentially higher vulnerability of private sector enterprises to takeovers, coupled with the threat of losing jobs and the resultant adverse reputation effects in the managerial market (Manne, 1965; Fama, 1980) , are argued to be effective mechanisms in disciplining management and aligning shareholder and managerial interests in private enterprises. The potential of such shareholder rebellion is virtually absent in public enterprises due to the nontradability of its shares.
Public choice theorists (e.g., Niskanen, 1971; Levy, 1988) , complementing the property rights viewpoint, point to specific X-inefficiency factors that arise from government ownership per se irrespective of market conditions. Based on the axiom of individual utility maximization, they argue that government officials are inclined to pursue their own interests, or the interests of pressure groups, rather than the interests of the public at large. Multiple and frequently changing objectives of these enterprises arising from government's attempts to accommodate diverse interest groups also exacerbates agency problems since outcomes of managerial decisions become more difficult to measure and monitor (Estrin and Perotin, 1991) .
Doubts over the conclusion of the property rights and public choice arguments have been raised in recent theoretical contributions that highlight the existence of free rider problems associated with takeovers of private enterprises (Grossman and Hart, 1980) , and the operation of the voting market as a substitute for the market for corporate control (Mueller, 1989; Wintrobe, 1987) in disciplining public enterprises. Finally, several contributions have argued that ownership does not matter in the presence of sufficient competition between private and public enterprises (Caves and Christensen, 1980; Borcherding et al., 1982; Millward, 1988) .
Existing empirical evidence on the ownership-performance issue closely mirrors the diversity in theoretical opinion and surveys of such evidence reach no consensus in their conclusions. On the one hand, the survey by Millward and Parker (1983) concludes that there is no systematic evidence that public enterprises are less cost effective than private firms. On the other hand, there are two surveys, one nearly concurrent with the aforementioned one (Borcherding et al., 1982) and another more recent (Vining and Boardman, 1992) , that find the weight of evidence to be in favor of the property rights and public choice viewpoints.
The objective of this paper is to make another contribution to the ownershipperformance issue from the perspective of a developing economy. Nearly all published econometric studies on ownership-performance have been based on developed countries, particularly the United States. It is a widely accepted fact that institutional conditions in developing countries, particularly those with respect to markets and organizations, are significantly different from those in developed countries. Typical characteristics of a developing country are incomplete markets and various forms of market failures. Institutional conditions in such a country in general defy the basic foundation of the property rights argument of private enterprise superiority, namely, the strong link between the market for takeovers, i.e., the market for corporate control, and the efficiency of private enterprise. This is in contrast to the situation in developed countries where, by some accounts, overt managerialist behavior in private enterprises is highly risky as takeover markets are active and largely complete (see for example, Coffee, 1986; Jarrell et al., 1988) .
The link between the market for corporate control and enterprise performance in developing countries can be weak for several reasons. To begin with, the effectiveness of shareholder monitoring through the threat of selling off shares is only possible if the shareholders and potential raiders are well informed about true company performance. However, as is widely acknowledged, there is considerable information poverty in developing countries so that the true performance of a company may not be accurately transmitted through the share price. The transactions costs associated with a takeover are also much higher in developing countries where the transfer of shares between buyers and sellers often takes a considerable amount of time. Takeover regulations in these countries are also very stringent because of often-justified fears of monopoly and foreign exploitation. Finally, as the experience of some countries suggest, the success or failure of takeovers depends to a large extent on the ability of a potential raider to garner government support. The government's policy leverage in such matters stems from the fact that government-owned institutional investors often have controlling interests in private-sector enterprises.
Given the absence of an active market for corporate control that forms the building block of the property rights hypothesis, it is possible to argue that private enterprises need not perform better than public enterprises, that is, ownership will not matter significantly in developing countries. While a few empirical studies attempt to shed some light on the ownership-performance relationship within the institutional specifics of a developing country (Kim, 1981; Hill, 1982; and Mohamed, 1992) , in these cases too, the verdict is not clear. Moreover, all of these studies have been conducted in the backdrop of strongly interventionist and regulated regimes and are relatively dated. The conclusions of these studies, although valuable, have limited applicability in the nineties when the economic environment of many developing countries are emerging after significant liberalization and deregulation.
We address the ownership-performance issue using a case study of the Indian banking industry. Apart from being within the institutional setting of an emerging economy, the Indian banking industry provides a suitable testing ground for several reasons. First, it is characterized by the existence of both public and private banks in a largely deregulated and an increasingly competitive environment. Second, the Indian banking industry provides a test for performance differentials not only between public and private enterprises but also between different types of private ownership, foreign and domestic, and within domestic, between closely and widely held private enterprises. A comparison across the entire spectrum of ownership forms, not yet attempted in any of the existing studies, can give important insights into the factors that are responsible for driving efficiency differentials. Last, but not the least, a study of the Indian banking industry may provide valuable insights into the ownership-performance relationship with respect to an industry in which privatization has become an important policy issue, but on which there exists just a few empirical studies. We know of two on Australian banking (Davies, 1981; and Davies and Brucato, 1987) , and one on Hungarian banking (Sabi, 1996) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional structure and the regulatory environment of the Indian banking industry. Section 3 presents the performance measures and the empirical model. Section 4 contains the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
Like most banking systems in developing countries, the banking system in India is characterized by the coexistence of different ownership groups, public and private, and within private, domestic and foreign. Public sector banks in India came into existence in several stages. First, the nationalization in the fifties of the Imperial Bank of India and seven banks of the princely states formed the State Bank of India and its seven associate banks. Then, two phases of nationalization of most of the major private sector banks by the Government of India (GOI) followed in 1969 and in 1980. While the nonnationalized private sector banks, as well as the foreign banks, were allowed to coexist with public sector banks, their activities were highly restricted through entry regulation and strict branch licensing policies. As a result, public sector banks came to dominate the banking business, accounting for nearly 90% of total deposits and advances in 1990-1991, with the residual being almost equally split between the private and foreign banks. As of that year, 27 public sector banks, 23 private banks, and 23 foreign banks operated in the Indian banking industry.
All commercial banks in India are regulated by the country's Central Bank, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). In 1991-1992, the RBI launched major banking sector reforms aimed at creating a more profitable, efficient, and sound banking system, based on the recommendations of the Narasimham Committee on Financial Sector Reforms. The fundamental philosophy underlying the reforms was to make the banking system more responsive to changes in market conditions and to reduce the intervention of the RBI to that of an arm's length regulator. This was a significant change compared to prereform scenarios in which most of the major operational parameters of all banks were regulated and micromanaged by the RBI. The reforms sought to improve bank efficiency through entry deregulation, branch delicensing, deregulation of interest rates, and allowing public sector banks to raise up to 49% of their equity in the capital market. In 1994-1995 six private banks, promoted mostly by government-owned financial institutions, and three foreign banks entered the banking industry.
The reforms also sought to improve bank profitability through the gradual reduction of the cash reserve ratio and the statutory liquidity ratio and to strengthen the banking system through the institution of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) norm of an 8% capital adequacy ratio, in addition to stringent income recognition and provisioning norms. The reforms also aimed to create a more level playing field between the domestic banks and the foreign banks. While regulations related to reserve requirement, interest rate policy, and prudential norms have always been applied uniformly by the RBI across all the bank groups, prior to the reforms, foreign banks were exempt from earmarking any portion of their credit disbursement to the priority sectors under the directed credit programs of the RBI. By contrast, 40% of total credit of both public and domestic private banks was directed in this fashion. Since 1993, however, foreign banks were required to allocate 32% of their total credit to priority sectors.
All public sector banks until 1991-1992 were fully owned by the Government of India (GOI). After the reforms these banks were allowed to access the capital market to raise up to 49% of their equity, and as of 1994-1995, two banks have done so. The management of public sector banks falls under the purview of the Department of Banking in the Finance Ministry of GOI, which directly appoints the managing directors of these banks and determines the constitution of the Board of Directors. Given its proprietary interests, the GOI has its representatives on the Board of Directors, and, as the Report of the Narasimham Committee on Financial Sector Reforms (1991) had noted, there is a considerable degree of government intervention in the day to day operational decisions of these banks that has seriously abridged their operational autonomy.
Domestic private sector banks in India are typically of two types: old banks that coexisted with the public banks since nationalization and new banks that came into existence after entry deregulation in 1992. The old banks are typically small in size and regional in orientation. Most of these banks, until recently, were closely held by local communities. However, since 1992, an increasing number of these banks have accessed the capital market to raise funds and have thus become widely held. The shareholding is predominantly regional in nature and the secondary market for their shares, while it exists, is relatively weak as is evidenced from the low volume of shares traded. Of the 23 old private banks in operation in [1994] [1995] 12 were publicly traded. In contrast to the old private banks, the new banks are much larger in size, have larger capital base, operate primarily in metropolitan areas, and are technologically superior. In 1994-1995, six new banks completed one year of operations, but their share in total banking business remained marginal, owing largely to their limited branch network.
In many developing countries it is not uncommon to find governmentowned financial institutions holding controlling stakes in private sector enterprises through which the government can exert significant influence on their operations. However, in India, a scanning of data on the equity-holding pattern of the old private sector banks reveals that neither government bodies nor government-owned financial institutions have any equity shareholding in nontraded banks, and in the case of traded banks, this share is insignificant (Bombay Stock Exchange Directory, several issues) .
2 This in turn is reflected by the absence of any nominees of the government-owned financial institutions on the Board of Directors of these private sector banks (Annual Reports of Private Sector Banks). It is only in the new private sector banks that government-owned financial institutions have substantial equity participation, as most of the new banks were promoted by these institutions. Subsequently, the new banks have been in the process of reducing the promoters' stake, as required by RBI regulations, through raising equity in the capital market.
Foreign banks in India have operated through branch offices rather than as subsidiaries of parent banks. The equity owned by the foreign branches is part of the equity of their parent banks in the country of incorporation. The shares of foreign banks, unlike those of the domestic private sector banks, are not traded in India.
Since the initiation of the reforms, signs of increased competition has appeared in the Indian banking industry, as is evident in the decline of the four-bank asset concentration ratio from 0.49 in 1991-1992 to 0.44 in 1994-1995 , by the growing presence of the private and foreign banks (Table 1) , and in the appearance of service competition (Sarkar and Agrawal, 1997) . The performance of public banks has also become more market-driven with growing emphasis put on profitability as an important benchmark for evaluating their performance by policy makers in the postreforms era (MOF, 1993) .
PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND THE EMPIRICAL MODEL

Performance Measures
Financial management theories offer a number of criteria for evaluating a bank's performance. These include profitability and efficiency measures. Two profitability measures and four efficiency measures are used in our analysis. These measures have been used in previous studies for analyzing bank performance and correspond closely to the measures suggested in the literature for analyzing performance of banking institutions in developing markets (Barltrop and McNaughton, 1992) .
Profitability measures used to evaluate bank performance should take into account both the risk and the return associated with the bank's portfolio. The two profitability measures used in our analysis are:
1. Return on assets (ROA) defined as the net profit of the bank divided by average total assets. ROA measures the ability of the management to convert the assets of the bank into net earnings.
2. Operating profit ratio (OPR) defined as the operating profit (or net operating income) of the bank divided by average total assets. OPR measures the ability of the management to keep revenue growth ahead of rising costs.
While ROA and OPR are both profitability measures, they are different in their treatment of risk given the accounting norms imposed by the RBI. Operating profit includes the amount earmarked for provisions and contingencies, while net profit excludes this amount. Provisions and contingencies in turn include (i) provisions for taxes, (ii) provisions for doubtful debts, and (iii) provisions that have to be made to account for the degree of risk of loans and advances made by the banks per the RBI guidelines. The higher the risk of the loan, the higher is the amount to be set aside as provisions.
3 Two banks with identical OPR can differ in terms of ROA due to the difference in riskiness of their loan portfolio. Thus ROA can be taken as a proxy for riskadjusted return, while OPR can be taken as a proxy for raw return. 4 The four efficiency measures used in our analysis are 5 :
1. Net interest margin (NIM), defined as the difference between interest earned and interest expended, divided by average total assets. NIM measures the core earning capacity of the bank and is an indicator of the efficiency of the overall portfolio management of the bank.
2. Operating profit to staff expense (OPSE), defined as the operating profit of the bank, divided by the total staff expense. OPSE measures the bank's return on investment made on staffing and is an indicator of labor productivity.
3. Operating cost ratio (OCR), defined as the total operating cost of the bank, divided by average total assets. OCR measures the extent of inputs or resources used in managing the assets of the bank and is an indicator of overall operating efficiency.
4. Staff expense ratio (SER), defined as the total staff expense of the bank, divided by average total assets. SER measures the extent of manpower expenses and is an indicator of labor usage.
The Empirical Model
Our discussion in Section 2 suggests that performance of banks in different groups depends not only on their ownership status but also on other variables that reflect differences in their regulatory environment. The effect of these variables needs to be controlled for in order to isolate the ownership effect on the performance of the different bank groups. Accordingly, the following analysis of covariance model is estimated:
where x denotes the vector of control variables and e denotes the error term with the usual classical properties. This specification is similar to the standard specification that is used in the empirical industrial organization literature to evaluate ownership effects on performance.
This model is estimated for each performance indicator by pooling data for two years, 1993-1994 and 1994-1995 on 27 public banks, 23 domestic private banks, and 23 foreign banks. The new private-sector banks are not included in our analysis since data is available only for the year 1994-1995. In any case, since these banks are in their infancy, it would not be appropriate to draw any meaningful conclusion about their performance based on only one year of operations. The data is obtained from various issues of the report Performance Highlights, published by the Indian Banks' Association. The publication reports annual data from the profit and loss accounts and the balance sheets of all public, private, and foreign banks operating in the Indian banking industry.
Two ownership dummies, private and foreign, are included in the model so that performance is measured relative to that of public sector banks. Since the estimation uses pooled data of two years, a time dummy, time, is also included to allow for any significant time effects between these years. The time dummy is interacted with the ownership dummies, private and foreign, to allow the time effects to be different for private and foreign banks. The control variables include the log of the total assets of the bank, the proportion of investment in government securities, the proportion of loans made to priority sector, the proportion of rural and semi-urban branches, and the proportion of noninterest income to total income.
Total assets are introduced into the regression to account for possible scale effects in bank operations. The next three variables are included to control for differences in performance that may arise due to the differences in regulatory requirements imposed on the operation of domestic and foreign banks. The justification for including these variables is apparent from the description of the regulatory environment in Section 2. The last control variable, namely the proportion of noninterest income to total income, is included to account for the extent of a bank's diversification in fee-based services. Income from fee-based services increases the bank's earning without increasing its liabilities and has a favorable effect on its performance. In the period prior to the reforms when branch expansion was restricted by the RBI, foreign banks had actively diversified into fee-based services.
Before presenting the empirical results the important issue of endogeneity, which is often debated in the ownership-performance literature, needs to be addressed. It is argued that public ownership and performance are not strictly exogenous since enterprises that perform very poorly are likely to be taken over by the government to prevent them from going out of business. In our case, the selection of banks that were nationalized and, hence, became public was based not on poor financial performance, but on their ability to implement the government's social objectives. In any case, since the last phase of nationalization happened 17 years ago in 1980, any endogeneity that may have existed between performance and ownership at the time of nationalization can be expected to have worked itself out during this period and, thus, have little effect in determining current performance.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The mean and standard deviations of the various performance indicators for the different bank groups are presented for the year 1993-1994 in Table  2 . In 1993-1994 the average return on assets (ROA) of foreign banks was around 2% compared to only 0.25% for private banks. Public banks performed very poorly in terms of this criterion; their ROA was 01.59%. Also, the standard deviation of ROA was much lower for foreign banks, suggesting that they were more homogenous in terms of their profitability performance, compared with both private and public banks. In terms of operating profit ratio (OPR), the relative positions were similar. Foreign banks performed the best (5.34%), followed by private banks (1.80%), and then by public banks (0.92%). Again, the standard deviations suggest that foreign banks were more homogenous with respect to performance.
Regarding operating efficiency indicators, while foreign banks were clearly ahead, the differences between private banks and public banks were not very significant. Foreign banks earned a much higher net interest margin and generated substantially higher income for every rupee spent on staff expense. The average operating cost ratio (OCR) of 2.13 for foreign banks was much lower compared to the corresponding figures of 3.15 and 2.98 for private and public banks, respectively. Note that the associated standard deviation for OCR was the lowest for public banks, suggesting that high operating cost was quite pervasive among public sector banks. With respect to staff expenses to total assets (SER), the mean for foreign banks was almost one-third of those for private (2.21%) and public (2.04%) banks.
The different bank groups varied substantially in terms of their characteristics. On average, assets of public banks were almost 10 times as large as those of foreign banks and fifteen times as large as those of private banks. Public banks and private banks lent a much larger part of their resources to the priority sector, 14.27% and 12.71%, respectively, compared with foreign banks with 6.79%. However, all three bank groups invested an almost equal proportion (about 22%) of their resources in government securities. Foreign banks appeared to be slightly more diversified in their intermediation activities, as revealed by the proportion of noninterest income to total assets, compared with the private banks, which in turn were more diversified, compared with public banks. Foreign banks had no branches in rural areas. Compared with this, almost half of the branches of public banks and almost onethird of the branches of private banks were in rural areas.
In 1994-1995, two major changes over the previous year were observed. First, there was a significant increase in the ROA of private banks and public banks. The average ROA of private banks increased from 0.25% in 1993-1994 to 0.95% in 1994-1995 . For public banks, ROA increased from 01.59% in 1993-1994 to 0.13% in 1994-1995. Second, the proportion of resources lent by foreign banks to the priority sector increased significantly from 6.79% in 1993-1994 to 11.08% in 1994-1995 and, in the later year, was comparable to the priority sector lending of the public banks and private banks. Table 3 reports the results for the profitability and efficiency regressions that were estimated by the ordinary least squares (OLS) technique. 6 The coefficient of foreign is positive and significant at the 1% level in both the ROA and OPR regressions, which indicates that foreign banks are significantly more profitable than public sector banks after controlling for the regulatory and structural differences. On average, foreign banks have an ROA that is 3% higher and an OPR that is 4% higher than public banks.
Regression Results
Unlike the foreign dummy, the coefficient of private is significant and positive only in the ROA regression. Private banks have an ROA which is about 2% higher than that of public banks. However, the coefficient of private is not significant in the OPR regression. As our earlier discussion indicates, the main difference between ROA and OPR is the provisions and contingencies that include provisions for taxes, doubtful debts, and the riskiness of assets. The fact that private banks are similar to public banks with respect to OPR but superior with respect to ROA suggests that private banks do not differ significantly from public banks in terms of the income that they generate from their loan portfolio, but they are better in accounting for the riskiness of their portfolios.
The results also indicate the presence of significant time effects in the ROA regression. Public banks registered an increase of 1.7% in their ROA, while private banks registered an increase of 0.7%. This implies that the difference in ROA between public and private banks narrowed in the later year. Foreign banks, however, did not show any such increase. Unlike in the ROA regression, there are no significant time effects in the OPR regression.
As with the profitability regressions, the coefficients of foreign are significant at the 1% level in all the efficiency regressions. Foreign banks have a NIM which is 3% higher than that earned by public banks; they earn 10 times more income than public banks for every rupee spent on staff. At the same time, they spend about 1 1 2 % less on operating cost and nearly 2% less on staff expense, compared to the public banks.
In sharp contrast with the foreign dummy, the coefficients of the private dummy are insignificant in all the efficiency regressions. Private banks do not perform significantly better than public banks with respect to the net interest margin they earn on assets and the income they earn on every rupee spent on staff expense. At the same time, their operating cost and staff expense are as high as those of public banks.
The results indicate the absence of any significant time effects in all the efficiency regressions except in the case of NIM. The improvement in NIM for domestic banks could be because of the fact that, with increased deregula-tion and market orientation, these banks have become somewhat better in managing their portfolios and searching for cheaper sources of funds.
Our sample of private domestic banks consists of two different groups. The first group comprises 12 banks that are traded in the capital market and are widely held. The second group of banks are not traded in the capital market and are closely held. The property rights hypothesis suggests that the disciplining effect of the capital market is an important factor in making privately held firms operate more efficiently than their public counterparts. Thus, even if private banks as a group do not perform significantly better than publicly held banks, one might expect that traded private banks perform better than public banks and their nontraded counterparts. To test this hypothesis the profitability and efficiency regressions were re-estimated by further subdividing the private banks into two separate groups, traded and nontraded. Table 4 reports the results of the regressions with the traded and nontraded dummies. The regression equations were estimated using the instrumental variable (IV) rather than the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. To the extent that the performance of the private sector banks influences their ability to be traded in the market, it may be argued that the traded banks are likely to be better performing banks. If this is the case, the dummy variables traded and nontraded cannot be taken as exogenous, so that using OLS will produce inconsistent estimates (Maddala, 1986, pp. 257-264) .
Thus, before estimating the profitability and the efficiency regressions, we undertook a pretesting exercise to examine if the dummy variables traded and nontraded were, indeed, exogenous. The pretesting exercise involved estimating a probit regression for each of the traded and nontraded dummies and then testing whether the errors of the probit regression were correlated with the errors of the profitability and efficiency regressions. Such tests are commonly known in the literature as tests for selectivity bias. Our pretesting exercise indicated that in five of the six regressions, with the regression for NIM being the exception, the dummy variables could not be treated as exogenous. In such cases, an appropriate method of estimation is the IV method in which the predicted probabilities are taken as instruments for the dummy variables.
In the ROA regression the coefficient of only the traded dummy is positive and significant suggesting that while traded private banks perform better than publicly held banks, there is no significant difference in the rates of return earned by public and nontraded private banks. Traded private banks earn almost 3% more than public banks. In fact, there is no statistical difference in the returns earned by the traded private banks and foreign banks. In the OPR regression again, traded banks perform significantly better than public sector banks, a result that was not found when private banks were considered as a single group. However, unlike in the ROA regression, there is a large difference between the performance of the traded and foreign banks. Regard- ing the nontraded banks, the negative sign of the nontraded dummy suggests that these banks underperform compared to public banks, but the coefficient is not statistically significant at the 5% level.
The strong positive dominance of traded private banks over public banks observed in the profitability regressions does not obtain in the efficiency regressions. In fact, in three of the four efficiency regressions, there is no significant difference in performance of the traded banks and the public banks. However, the sign of the coefficients does suggest a weak dominance of the traded banks. With respect to the nontraded private banks, there is no significant differences in their performance vis-à-vis the public banks. Finally, in terms of all the efficiency indicators, the foreign banks perform significantly better than the traded banks, a result that was also found when the private banks were considered as a single group.
Combining the results of the profitability and efficiency regressions and comparing the performance of bank groups across the entire spectrum of ownership, the following rankings emerge: The above rankings suggest a weak ownership effect between public and private banks. Traded private banks are superior to public banks with respect to profitability measures, but they do not differ significantly from public banks with respect to the efficiency measures. Nontraded private banks, on the other hand, do not differ significantly from public banks either in terms of profitability or efficiency.
Among private banks, the significant difference in profitability between traded and nontraded banks highlights the possible disciplining role played by the capital market in improving an enterprise's bottomline. On the other hand, the absence of any such difference with respect to the other performance indicators suggests that this pressure exerted by the capital market is not strong enough to lead to an appreciable difference in cost efficiencies between the traded and nontraded banks.
The rankings also suggest a strong ownership effect between foreign and private banks; foreign banks outperform private banks with respect to all the indicators. That this effect has appeared after controlling for the differences in regulatory and structural characteristics that exist between these two groups suggests that other factors may be contributing to the superiority of foreign banks. The fact that foreign banks face substantially more pressure from their parent banks, most of which operate within the institutional confines of developed countries, is likely to be important in explaining their superiority.
The weak ownership effect that we observe for private banks has two other potential explanations. First, it may simply reflect the extent of government intervention in the workings of private banks. However, our discussion in Section 2, highlighting the minor presence of government-owned financial institutions both in the equity holding pattern and the management of private sector banks, suggests that the scope of such indirect government management in banking is relatively small.
The second possible explanation of the absence of significant differences in performance of public and private banks is that competition in the product market has eliminated these differences. However, implicit in this argument is the supposition that both private and public banks operate efficiently. The low rates of return earned by public banks and the large differentials that exist between them and the foreign banks in terms of all profitability and efficiency measures even after controlling for the regulatory and structural differences, renders this competition argument less plausible in explaining the relative performance of private and public banks.
We now discuss the effect of the control variables on the profitability and efficiency regressions. The coefficient of the size variable, log assets, is insignificant in the profitability regressions, but negative and significant in the efficiency regressions (Table 3 ). In the net interest margin (NIM) regression, the negative coefficient suggests a gradual reduction in interest spreads with an increase in the size of bank operation. However, in the operating profit (OPSE) regression, it suggests the presence of diminishing returns to income that could arise from increased difficulties in controlling employee slack with bank expansion. In the operating cost (OCR) and staff expense (SER) regressions, the negative coefficients indicate the presence of scale economies that may be due to fixed costs, e.g., rent, insurance, and auditors' or lawyers' fees.
The coefficient of priority-sector advance is insignificant in both the profitability regressions, as well as in all the efficiency regressions. The conventional wisdom that priority sector-advances erode the profitability of banks is not supported by our analysis. This result may be driven by the fact that, since 1993, interest rate subsidies on priority sector lending on loans above Rs, 200,000 have been reduced substantially. Similarly, the coefficient of proportion of rural branches to total branches, which is another specific characteristic of developing country banking, is weakly significant only in the ROA regression.
Investment in government securities has a negative and significant coefficient in the OPR and NIM regressions but not in the ROA regression. While the lower rates of interest earned on government securities might explain the negative effect, the fact that such investment is riskless and requires no provisioning might explain why this negative effect does not show up in the ROA regression. Finally, noninterest income has a positive and significant effect in both profitability regressions, suggesting that diversification into feebased business does indeed increase the bottomline of banks. However, the positive and significant coefficients in the staff expense and operating cost regressions suggest that the generation of such income, requiring, as it does, more qualified professionals, leads to higher costs.
CONCLUSIONS
Admittedly while each explained variable is at best a limited indicator of performance of the different bank groups, the results of our empirical analysis support our a priori expectation that private enterprises may not be unambiguously superior to public enterprises in a developing economy. While traded private banks were found to be superior to public banks with regard to both return on assets and income earning potential and private banks as a group (including nontraded banks) were found to be significantly superior with respect to the return on assets, it is interesting to note that neither traded nor nontraded private banks seem to have any comparative advantage with respect to the operational efficiency parameters. This result suggests only a weak ownership effect of private banks over public banks in India and contrasts sharply with the findings for the banking industry in a more developed economy, Australia. In that case, private banks were found to be superior, not only with respect to profitability, but also with respect to operating efficiency indicators such as higher net earnings per employee. Moreover, while our study suggests that public sector banks are less careful about managing the risk of their income portfolios, owing to the deep pockets of their owner, i.e., the government, the Australian study finds that such banks tend to prefer less risk. The distinct superiority of foreign banks over domestic banks that we find in our study is consistent with the findings of the study of the Hungarian banking sector.
The most interesting result of the present study, in our opinion, is the appearance of an ordering in the performances of different ownership groups that is consistent with the property rights and public choice theories. The relative performance of different groups seems to be correlated with the extent of their link with the market for corporate control. Foreign banks are found to be more profitable and efficient than traded private banks that are found to be more profitable than nontraded private banks. Nontraded banks, however, are not found to have any significant differences in performance, either with respect to profitability or efficiency vis-à-vis the public sector banks. Notwithstanding the limitations of generalizing from a restricted context, these findings suggest that a move towards privatization in developing countries should be accompanied by concerted efforts to strengthen the appropriate markets and institutions that create the necessary incentives for private firms. Under such circumstances, privatization is likely to be an effective policy for improving the performance of ailing public-sector enterprises in emerging economies like India.
